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RUMINATION, DISTRACTIBILITY, AND DEPRESSION I SUH & BARCH 
The Relationship Between Individual Differences in Rumination, 
Distractibility, and Depression 
David Y. Suh and Deanna M. Barch 
Washington University in St. Louis 
According to the response styles theory, rumination and distraction are two dfferent ways to respond to a negative 
stimulus. Previous studies on the relationship between rumination and distraction and their effect on depression 
have focused mainly on the active use of these response styles. In the present study, we examined how the natural 
tendency to be distractible was related to rumination or depression. Participants were asked to answer questionnaires 
to rumination, distractibility, and depression, and to perform an attention task. Self-reported level of rumination, 
depression, and distractibility all had a positive correlation with each other. However, task performance indexed by 
accuracy had a negative correlation with rumination. Contrary to our predictions, the results suggested that higher 
depression is related to more negative self-evaluation of distractibility. However, objective evidence of distractibility 
was related to less rumination, which was consistent with our predictions. 
Keywords: distractibility, rumination, depression, selective attention. 
Introduction 
Many studies have been conducted in an 
attempt to explain the variability in an individual's 
vulnerability to depression. The results of these 
studies have generated a number of theories about 
potential vulnerability factors to depression. One 
such theory is the response styles theory (RST), a 
cognitive explanation developed by Nolen-
Hoeksema (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 1998), which 
attempts to explain the relationship between 
depression and specific types of coping methods in 
response to the experience of a negative stimulus or 
negative affect. According to RST, the different 
styles of coping with a negative stimulus are related 
to the severity of depression, as the different coping 
methods are thought to influence an individual's 
attention bias and his or her ability to problem-
solve. RST argues that there are two main coping 
strategies in response to a negative affect: 
rumination and distraction. A ruminative response 
to negative affect refers to a coping strategy where 
the individual focuses on the negative affect (e.g. 
thinking about why he or she is so depressed) and 
its consequence (e.g. thinking that he or she will 
never get anything done because of the depressed 
mood) in order to gain more insight (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). In contrast, a distractive 
response to negative affect refers to a strategy where  
the individual attempts to actively distract himself 
or herself away from the negative affect to replace 
it with a neutral or a positive affect (e.g. listening 
to music or playing games when the individual feels 
depressed). This use of the concept of distraction 
refers to active and deliberate attempts to engage in 
activities that distract one from focusing on 
negative affect. However, there is little research on 
how individual differences in the natural tendency 
to be distractible relates to either individual 
differences in coping strategies or depression. In 
this study, distractibility is defined as one's natural 
tendency, or trait, to be more distracted by stimuli, 
internal (e.g. daydreaming) or external (e.g. aural, 
visual, etc.) in everyday life. The goal of the current 
study is to examine the relationships among 
individual differences in cognitive and self-report 
measures of distractibility, rumination and 
depression. 
In a large number of empirical studies, greater 
self-reported use of ruminative coping styles has 
been associated with higher self-reports of 
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Wilkinson, 
Croudace, & Goodyer, 2013). A meta-analysis 
conducted by Olatunji, Naragon-Gainey, and 
Wolitzky-Taylor (2013) confirmed that higher 
self-reports of rumination are correlated with 
higher self-reports of depression and that clinically 
depressed patients have significantly higher self- 
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reported use of rumination than non-patients. 
Furthermore, higher levels of self-reported 
ruminative responses have been found to correlate 
with higher self-reports of depression and anxiety 
in depressed adolescents and children (Donaldson, 
Lam, & Mathews, 2007). Similarly, higher trait 
rumination was found to correlate with more 
negative attention bias (e.g. focusing more on a 
negative stimulus such as discouraging words than 
to a neutral or a positive stimulus) for depressed 
patients (Donaldson et al., 2007). In contrast, 
higher levels of distractive responses have been 
found to correlate with lower self-reports of 
depression (Roelofs et al., 2009; Huffzinger & 
Kuehner, 2009). 
The above studies are consistent with the idea 
that rumination and distraction may have a causal 
effect with respect to depression, but are primarily 
correlational and thus do not establish causation. 
However, other studies have actually tried to 
identify whether there is a causal relationship 
between rumination and depression. For example, 
in a study by Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(1990), participants were instructed to engage in 
either a distracting or ruminative coping method 
after a negative mood induction. Those who were 
instructed to engage in ruminative coping method 
reported being more depressed than they were 
before the induction, and those who were 
instructed to engage in a distracting coping method 
reported being less depressed than they were before 
the induction. Furthermore, in a longitudinal study 
by Huffzinger, Reinhard, and Kuehner (2009), it 
was found that higher self-reports of rumination 
predicted more depressive symptoms in 
nonpatients in short- and long-term (5 months and 
3 years, respectively), and higher self-reports of 
depression predicted higher use of rumination in 
both former patients and nonpatients in short-
term. Similarly, Koval, Kuppens, Allen, and 
Sheeber (2012) found that rumination was a 
significant predictor of current depression severity 
in adolescents. These results are complimented by 
the findings of Spasojevie and Alloy (2001), which 
showed that, even after controlling for current 
depression, rumination acted as a mediator in 
predicting the number of prospective major 
depressive episode based on the risk factors (i.e. 
negative coping styles, self-criticism, neediness,  
and history of past depressions). Thus, these 
studies provide further evidence consistent with a 
causal role for rumination in contributing to the 
development of more severe depression. 
As described above, it is evident that 
rumination correlates with higher self-reports of 
depression, while distraction as an active coping 
method in response to negative affect correlates 
with lower self-reports of depression. In addition, 
a study by Watkins, Teasdale, and Williams (2000) 
showed that active distraction disrupts some 
mechanisms used for rumination, namely 
categorical memory recall, or the propensity to 
remember repeated events (e.g. making a mistake) 
in the past. In this study, the participants 
completed the Autobiographical Memory Test 
(AMT), which asked them to recall a personal 
memory tied to six positive words (e.g. happy), six 
negative words (e.g. failure), or six neutral words 
(e.g. bread) at three points in the experiment —
before distraction/rumination induction, after 
distraction/rumination induction, and after 
decentering/control prompt task. In the 
distraction/rumination induction, the participants 
were asked to engage in either distraction or 
rumination by thinking about prompts (e.g. "Think 
about the shape of a large black umbrella" for 
distraction and "Think about what your feelings 
might mean" for rumination). The results indicated 
that those in the rumination induction had a higher 
proportion of categorical memory recalled than 
those under distraction induction, consistent with 
the hypothesis that distraction blocks memory 
mechanisms that may contribute to rumination. 
From the studies described above, it is possible 
that active distraction is related to lower self-
reported depression possibly because distraction 
directly competes with the ability to engage in 
ruminative thinking. If so, then it is possible that 
individual differences in distractibility may 
influence both ruminative style and depression. By 
distractibility we mean an individual's natural 
tendency to be more distracted by internal or 
external stimuli in everyday life, which can be 
indexed either by performance on cognitive tasks 
(such as the Erikson flanker task, in which the 
participant is asked to identify the name of a 
cartoon character into one of the two given 
categories while being distracted by pictures that 
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show up next to the name) or by self report 
measures (questionnaires such as the Mindful 
Attention Awareness Scale, which contains 
questions like "I find it difficult to stay focused on 
what's happening in the present."). In this study, 
we choose to measure two different aspects of 
distractibility: mind wandering and mindfulness. 
Mind wandering has been hypothesized to 
represent vulnerability to being distracted (Forster 
& Lavie, 2014). On the other hand, mindfulness is 
thought to be the opposite of distractibility, as it is 
thought to entail the capacity for avoiding 
distraction (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Mrazek, 
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012). If an individual is 
naturally more distractible, they may be less likely 
or able to ruminate, and thus may experience less 
negative affect. However, there has been no work 
that explores the relationship between individual 
differences in distractibility and depression from 
the perspective of understanding whether those 
individuals who are more distractible are less likely 
to ruminate and thus less likely to experience 
depression. 
The goal of the current study was to test 
hypotheses about the relationship between 
distractibility, the use of ruminative responses to 
negative affect, and regular everyday depression. It 
is worth noting that, since the relationships shown 
in the studies referenced above have been 
established both in clinical depression and in 
normative samples that cover the depression 
spectrum, we can apply the same logic to look at 
regular everyday depression. We hypothesized that 
individuals who either self-reported higher levels of 
distractibility and/or showed more distractible 
performance on a cognitive task would be less likely 
to report using ruminative response styles when 
experiencing negative affect. Further, given the link 
between rumination and depression, we also 
hypothesized that individuals with higher levels of 
distractibility would show lower levels of 
depression, and if so, that this would be mediated 
by lower levels of rumination. 
Methods 
Participants 
Sixty-three undergraduate volunteers (Mage = 
19.71, SDage = 1.25; 17 male, 46 female) from 
Washington University in St. Louis were recruited 
through a volunteer website maintained by the 
Psychology Department. All participants met the 
criteria of being at least 18 years old, not self-
reporting a history of mental illness, and of not 
using psychotropic medication at the time of 
testing. For analyses involving the Beck Depression 
Inventory and the Mindful Attention Awareness 
Scale —Lapses Only, three participants' data were 
excluded due to incomplete responses. Table 1 
shows the demographic characteristics of the 
sample group. All participants were between the 
ages of 18 and 22 and were Washington University 
undergraduates with at least 12 years of education. 
Measures 
Rumination. The Rumination Responses 
Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) 
is a 22-item scale used to measure everyday 
ruminative responses to the negative mood. The 
scale ranges from 1 (almost never) to 4 (always), 
with total scores indicating the overall likelihood of 
the use of ruminative responses. It has been shown 
to be a reliable and valid measure of rumination, 
with the internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) of 
.89 (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Roelofs, 
Muris, Huibers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2006). 
Depression and anxiety. Two questionnaires 
were used to measure the self-reported level of 
depression. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-
II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a 21-item scale 
widely used to measure self-reported levels of 
depression, with the internal consistency 
(Cronbach's alpha) of .93. The Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X; Watson & 
Clark, 1994) is a scale that measures the degree of 
various feelings (e.g. anger, sadness, shyness, 
serenity, joviality, etc.) one experiences in everyday 
life. Its internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) 
ranges from .83 to .90 for Positive Affect and .85 
to .90 for Negative Affect. The Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 
1988) is a 21-item scale used to measure self- 
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reported levels of anxiety with internal consistency 
(Cronbach's alpha) ranging from .92 to .94. This 
scale was used to address potential confounding 
variables, as depression is known to positively 
correlate with anxiety. Thus, BAI was used to 
determine whether any obtained effects were 
mainly due to depression, not anxiety. 
Distractibility. A number of measures were 
used to assess different aspects of distractibility. 
The Daydreaming Frequency Scale (DFS; Singer 
& Antrobus, 1970) is a 12-item subscale of the 
Imaginal Processes Inventory that measures the 
self-reported level of mind wandering in everyday 
life. The option ranges from A (never) to E (most 
of the time), with total scores signifying the overall 
likelihood to engage in daydreaming. It is shown to 
have a good internal consistency (with Cronbach's 
alpha of .91), good test-retest reliability, and good 
concurrent validity (Giambra, 1993; Tanaka & 
Huba, 1985). The Mindful Attention Awareness 
Scale — Lapses Only (MAAS-LO; Carriere, 
Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008) is a 12-item scale 
modified from MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003), a 
14-item scale used to measure the level of everyday 
lapses of attention (e.g. "I get so focused on the goal 
I want to achieve that I lose touch with what I'm 
doing right now to get there."). MAAS-LO aims 
to only look at attention lapses, so it eliminates two 
items from MAAS related to the consequences of 
attention lapses and one item related to attention 
lapses while driving. The responses for each item 
range from 1 (almost always) to 6 (almost never). 
MAAS is shown to have good test-retest reliability 
and validity with Cronbach's alpha of .92 (Brown 
& Ryan, 2003). The Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaires (CFQ Broadbent, Cooper, 
Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982) is a 25-item scale used 
to measure the level of everyday cognitive failures 
caused by attention lapses (e.g. "Do you find you 
forget why you went from one part of the house to 
the other?"). The responses for each item range 
from 0 (never) to 4 (very often), and the total scores 
correspond to the overall forgetfulness. It is shown 
reliable and valid with the Cronbach's alpha 
ranging from .85 to .89 (Broadbent et al., 1982; 
Tipper & Baylis, 1987). 
Attention task. To measure distractibility 
during cognitive performance, we used a modified 
Erikson flanker task (Forster & Lavie, 2014). In  
this task, the participants were presented a target, 
either the name of 6 Disney characters (Mickey, 
Donald, Pluto, Pooh, Piglet, Tigger) or 6 
superheroes (Superman, Spiderman, Hulk, 
Wolverine, Batman, Robin) for 2000 ms following 
a central fixation point (500 ms) on a computer 
screen. The target was presented in one of the six 
positions from the central fixation point, ranging 
from 2.3 degrees below to 2.3 degrees above. The 
majority of the trials (90%) were presented with 
just the target. 10% of the trials had an equal 
chance of having a task-congruent distractor, task-
incongruent distractor, or a task-irrelevant 
distractor. A task-congruent distractor is a picture 
from the same set as the target (e.g. Mickey if the 
target is Pooh). A task-incongruent distractor is a 
picture from the other set (e.g. Superman if the 
target is Pooh). A task-irrelevant distractor is a 
picture from neither the Disney nor the superhero 
set (a picture from a 6 cartoon character set: 
SpongeBob SquarePants, Hello Kitty, Cartman 
from the South Park cartoon, Bart Simpson, an 
Angry Bird, and Pikachu). These distractors were 
presented either to the left or right to the target. 
Participants were asked to push buttons to indicate 
whether the target was a superhero name or a 
Disney character name as fast and as accurately as 
possible. Participants completed 12 blocks of 60 
trials, and the first three trials of each block were 
considered warm-up trials and were excluded from 
analysis. Participants were asked to verbally 
identify all of the cartoon characters involved in 
this task prior to the start of the task to make sure 
they were already familiar with all the characters. 
As a measure of distraction, we focused on the 
difference between the no-distractor condition and 
the task-incongruent condition by calculating the 
differences in reaction time and accuracy between 
the two conditions. 
Procedure 
First, participants completed an informed 
consent form to make sure they knew the general 
procedure and risk of participating in the study. 
Then, they completed the modified Eriksen flanker 
task according to the steps described above. After 
the task, they completed the battery of 
questionnaires about depression, rumination, and 
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distractibility listed above. In the end, they were 
debriefed with an explanation of the goal of the 
study. 
Data Analysis 
To analyze the relationships among 
rumination, depression, and distractibility, we 
computed Pearson Product-Moment correlation 
among all the questionnaires using SPSS 21. 
Furthermore, we computed Pearson Product-
Moment correlation and performed mediation 
analyses for all questionnaires and the reaction time 
differences and the accuracy differences using 
SPSS 21 to examine the relationship between task 
performance and self-reported level of 
distractibility, rumination, and depression. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the 
questionnaires used in this study. 
Rumination and Depression 
The Pearson Product-Moment correlation 
coefficients among RRS, BDI-II, Sadness subscale 
of PANAS-X, BAI, CFQ, DFS, and MAAS-LO 
are shown in Table 3. As expected, we were able to 
replicate the well-documented relationship 
between rumination and depression. RRS, which 
measures the self-reported level of rumination, had 
a moderate positive correlation with BDI-II. 
Similarly, RRS also had a moderate positive 
correlation with the Sadness subscale of PANAS-
X. 
Self-Reported Distractibility, Rumination and 
Depression 
We hypothesized that self-reported 
distractibility and rumination would be negatively 
correlated. However, as shown in Table 3, both 
CFQ and DFS were moderately positively 
correlated with the RRS. Furthermore, MAAS-
LO had a strong positive correlation with RRS. 
Similarly, we had also hypothesized that self-
reported distractibility and depression would be 
negatively correlated. However, as shown in Table 
BDI-II was moderately positively correlated 
with CFQ and MAAS-LO. Furthermore, the  
Sadness subscale of PANAS-X had a moderate 
positive correlation with DFS. 
Correlation between Task Performance and 
Rumination 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the 
attention task, including the reaction time 
differences and the accuracy differences between 
the no-distractor condition and the incongruent 
distractor condition. The one-way repeated 
measures ANOVAs for accuracy and reaction time 
(RT) comparing the conditions (no distractor, 
congruent distractor, neutral distractor, and 
incongruent distractor), replicated the result of the 
previous study. There was a significant main effect 
of condition for reaction time, F(3,63) = 136.29, p 
< .001. Post-hoc contrasts indicated that the 
incongruent and neutral conditions did not differ 
significantly in RT, but both were significantly 
slower than the no-distraction condition (p < .05). 
Further, the no-distraction condition was faster 
than the congruent condition (p < .05). There was 
also a significant main effect for accuracy, F(3,63) 
= 58.60,p < .001. Post-hoc contrasts indicated that 
all conditions were significantly different (ps < 
.001). Performance was best in the congruent 
condition, followed by the no-distractor condition, 
followed by the neutral condition, with the worse 
performance in the incongruent condition. 
We had hypothesized that rumination and 
distractibility (measured by the accuracy and 
reaction time difference between the task-
irrelevant and no-distraction condition) would be 
negatively correlated, such that those individuals 
who were more distractible would show less 
rumination. As shown in Table 5, RRS was not 
correlated with the RT measure of distractibility, 
but was negatively correlated with the accuracy 
measure of distractibility. In other words, greater 
distractibility was associated with less rumination. 
However, the other self-report measures for 
depression and distractibility were not correlated 
with the accuracy or the reaction time of the 
attention task. 
Mediation Analysis 
We had originally hypothesized that 
greater distractibility would be associated with 
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lower rumination and that this in turn would 
be associated with less depression. This 
hypothesis suggests that rumination should 
mediate 	 any 	 relationship 	 between 
distractibility and depression. For our object 
measure of distractibility, indexed by attention 
task performance, we did see the predicted 
relationship to rumination, but we did not see 
any relationship between objective 
distractibility and depression. Thus, the 
conditions for testing a mediator model for 
objective distractibility were not met. Further, 
we did not find the predicted direction of 
relationships 	 between 	 self-reported 
distractibility and either rumination or 
depression. In contrast to our hypotheses, we 
found positive relationships between all of our 
self-report measures of distractibility and 
rumination, and positive relationship between 
CFQ and MAAS-LO measures and 
depression. One potential hypothesis, as 
discussed in more detail below, is that 
depression contributes to greater negative self-
evaluations, and if so, then depression could be 
mediating the relationship between 
rumination and self-reported distractibility. 
To test this hypothesis for CFQ and 
MAAS-LO measures (which were correlated 
with both depression and rumination), we used 
the PROCESS model developed by Preacher 
and Hayes (Hayes, 2013). For CFQ.. the 
PROCESS analyses indicated that depression 
was a significant mediator of the relationship 
between rumination and CFQ(/3 = .1259, 95% 
CI: .0364, .2767), although this mediation was 
only partial, as the direct effect of rumination 
to CFQwas still significant (/3 = .2813, t = 
2.23, p = .0294). However, depression did not 
mediate the relationship between rumination 
and either DFS (/3 = .0198, 95% CI: -.2097, 
.1231), or MAAS-LO (/3 = .0363, 95% CI: -
.0048, .1280). 
Discussion 
In this study, we aimed to explore the 
relationship among individual differences in 
distractibility, rumination, and depression. 
Specifically, 	 we 	 hypothesized 	 that 
distractibility indexed by self-report and the 
task performance on a cognitive task would be 
negatively correlated with rumination, and that 
given the positive correlation between 
rumination and depression found in various 
studies, distractibility would in turn be 
negatively correlated with depression. 
However, instead we found seemingly 
contradicting relationships. We were able to 
replicate the well-documented positive 
correlation between rumination and 
depression. 	 Furthermore, 	 distractibility 
measured by the accuracy on the selective 
attention task had a negative correlation with 
the self-reported level of rumination, which 
was consistent with our hypothesis. However, 
contrary to our predictions, we found that 
distractibility measured by self-report was 
associated with greater rumination and 
depression, which was not consistent with our 
hypotheses. 
Opposite to our expectations, a higher self-
reported level of distractibility was correlated 
with a higher self-reported level of rumination 
and depression. This result could be seen as 
contradictory to the studies discussed in the 
introduction that found a negative relationship 
between the use of distraction and depression. 
As described in the introduction, prior work 
suggests that distractive responses to negative 
stimuli could work against depression and 
rumination (Huffzinger & Kuehner, 2009; 
Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Roelofs 
et al., 2009). However, our findings suggest 
that self-reported distractibility was positively 
associated with both rumination and 
depression. 
Although finding that higher depression 
was associated with higher self-reported 
MODERN PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES 	 55 
RUMINATION, DISTRACTIBILITY, AND DEPRESSION I SUH & BARCH 
distractibility is contradicting to our 
hypothesis, there is evidence suggesting that 
depression in fact may affect cognitive 
functions such as attention and therefore may 
be associated with worse distractibility. A 
meta-analysis by Snyder (2013) found that 
depressed patients had executive function 
impairments compared to healthy controls, 
with such impaired executive functions 
including attentional performance. Similarly, a 
meta-analysis by Rock, Roiser, Riedel, and 
Blackwell (2014) showed that clinically 
depressed patients had moderate cognitive 
deficits in executive function, memory, and 
attention compared to the control group, and 
that even after remission, the patients still had 
moderate cognitive deficits in executive 
function and attention. Further, Hasselbalch, 
Knorr, and Kessing (2011) showed that 
clinically depressed patients in remission 
showed a decrease in sustained and selective 
attention, memory, and executive function. 
Therefore, these meta-analyses suggest that 
more severe depression may in fact be related 
to higher distractibility or poorer attention. In 
the current study, we did not find that 
depression related to task performance, though 
it was significantly related to self-reported 
cognitive distractibility. As noted previously, 
however, this was a non-clinical sample and a 
higher level of depression severity may be 
needed before objective cognitive impairments 
are found. 
In contrast, it is worth noting that, unlike 
self-reported distractibility, distractibility 
indexed by task performance had a modest 
relationship with rumination in the predicted 
direction, at least for accuracy. Since the 
accuracy difference was calculated by 
subtracting the accuracy in the no distractor 
condition by the accuracy in the incongruent 
distractor condition, a negative correlation 
reveals that, the lower the self-reported level of 
rumination, the greater the effect of the 
incongruent distractor condition. In other  
words, those who are more distracted on the 
attention task had a lower self-reported level of 
rumination. This result is consistent with our 
hypothesis, though as noted above, we did not 
find that performance on the attention task 
was also related to lower depression. 
As described above, we found strong 
positive relationships between depression and 
self-reports of distractibility, but no 
relationship between depression and 
distractibility measured by attention task 
performance. Further, we found no 
relationships 	 between 	 self-reported 
distractibility and distractibility measured by 
attention task performance. One hypothesis to 
explain this discrepancy between self-reports 
of distractibility and attention task 
performance is that it may be evidence of 
negative bias among depressed people, who 
may be more likely to negatively evaluate their 
personal attributes, including distractibility. 
Such a result was also found in a study by 
Zuroff, Colussy, and Wielgus (1983). More 
specifically, we found that individuals who 
reported higher depression also reported that 
they had worse attention and were more 
distractible. However, their objective task 
performance did not provide any evidence that 
they actually were more distractible. Thus, 
their higher self-reported distractibility may 
reflect a negative self-evaluation bias associated 
with depression. This hypothesis is consistent 
with the results of our mediation analysis of the 
self-report measures in this study, as we found 
that depression was a significant partial 
mediator of the relationship between 
rumination and distractibility indexed by 
CFQ 
It is worth noting the limitations of the 
study. The most significant limitation is the 
sample group composition. Only Washington 
University undergraduates who signed up via 
the Psychology Subject Pool were included in 
the study, and the sample had a high gender 
skew towards female (73% of the sample). 
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Thus, our results may not be representative of 
the general population and it is possible that 
different results might be found in a more 
diverse population or in a more severely 
depressed population. Furthermore, the 
majority of the relationships that were that 
were statistically significant were self-report 
measures, which may not be the most accurate 
depiction of the participant's behavior in real 
life due to various biases. For example, the 
answers may be distorted by the social 
desirability bias, which could drive an 
individual exaggerate their answers to fit with 
what is desirable in society (e.g. saying they are 
nicer than they actually are). Moreover, the 
participant's answer may be affected by his or 
her mood at the time (e.g. scoring higher on a 
happiness scale because he or she just watched 
something funny). In order to overcome this 
limitation, in future work it would be 
informative to gather data from the perspective 
of the participant's friends or family members 
in order to obtain a more complete depiction 
of the participant. 
In conclusion, this study showed that 
individual differences in self-reported 
distractibility, unlike active distraction as a 
coping method, were not associated with 
reduced rumination or depression. instead we 
found that greater self-reported distractibility 
was associated with higher rumination and 
depression. This finding is more consistent 
with the literature suggesting that depression 
may be associated with impaired cognitive 
function. However, further research is needed 
to explore the potentially causal relationships 
between depression and distractibility, as the 
meta-analyses above demonstrate the 
relationship between depression and cognitive 
impairment, but do not establish the causal 
pathways. We did find that greater 
distractibility on an attention task was 
associated with lower rumination, but was not 
further associated with depression. This 
discrepancy between the attention task  
performance and the self-reported level of 
distractibility needs to be further explored to 
test whether it is due to the negative bias in 
depressed people or it is due to some other 
factor. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 
Demo ra hic characteristics of the sam le • rou 
Male (N=17, 27%) Female (N=46, 73%) 
Age (M, SD) 
Ethnicity (N, %) 
19.65, 0.93 19,74, 1.36 
Asian 4, 23.5% 15, 32.6% 
Black or African American 1, 5.9% 3, 6.5% 
White 11, 64.7% 26, 56.5% 
More than one race 0, 0% 2, 4.3% 
Other 1, 5.9% 0, 0% 
Educatio y1 in 
 ears (M, SD)  13.24, 1.25 13.93, 1.55 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for the questionnaire scores 
BAI 	 BDI-II 	 CFQ 	 DFS 	 MAAS-LO Sadness subscale 	 RRS 
(PANAS-X) 
M 10.857 9.267 39.619 27.238 35.967 10.635 44.794 
SD 9.17 7.52 12.97 8.14 9.01 3.86 13.02 
Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory=II; PANAS-X = Sadness subscale of Positive and Negative Affect Scale; BAI = Beck Anxiety 
Inventory; CFQ= Cognitive Failures Questionnaire; DFS = Daydreaming Frequency Scale; MAAS-LO = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale - 
Lapses Only. 
Table 3 
Pearson Product-Moment correlations among self-reported distractibility, rumination, depression and 
anxiety  
BDI-II PANAS-X BAI CFQ DFS MAAS-LO 
Ruminative Responses Scale .36-  .45-  .24 .36-  .28* .52" 
Beck Depression Inventory .50-  .50-  .44-  .20 .31* 
Sadness subscale (PANAS-X) .20 .23 .38-  .25 
Beck Anxiety Inventory .30* .09 .27* 
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire .35-  .55" 
Daydreaming Frequency Scale .48- 
** p < .01, 2-tailed. 
*p< .05, 2-tailed. 
Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory - II; PANAS-X = Sadness subscale of Positive and Negative Affect Scale; BAI = 
Beck Anxiety Inventory; CFQ= Cognitive Failures Questionnaire; DFS = Daydreaming Frequency Scale; MAAS-LO = Mindful 
Attention Awareness Scale - Lapses Only. 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics for the task data 
Incongruent Distractor 	 Irrelevant Distractor 
 
Congruent Distractor 	 No Distractor 
       
RT (ms) 	 ACC 	 RT (ms) 	 ACC 	 RT (ms) 	 ACC 	 RT (ms) 	 ACC 
M 715.992 0.831 706.787 0.897 621.122 0.939 611.626 0.922 
SD 108.40 0.09 102.69 0.07 82.03 0.05 71.63 0.05 
Note. RT = Reaction time (in ms); ACC = Accuracy. 
Table 5 
Pearson Product-Moment correlations among self-reported distractibility, rumination, depression, 
anxiety and attention task data  
(No distractor) - (Incongruent) 
Reaction time Accuracy 
Ruminative Responses Scale .07 -.25* 
Beck Depression Inventory .21 .01 
Sadness Subscale (PANAS-X) .06 -.08 
Beck Anxiety Inventory -.02 .02 
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire -.05 .04 
Daydreaming Frequency Scale -.02 -.02 
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale - Lapses Only  -.03 -.18 
*p< .05, 2-tailed. 
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